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AMERICAN BOMBING OF LIBYA: AN INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ANALYSIS
by Gregory Francis Intoccia*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States-initiated aerial bombing of targets inside the borders
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah which took place on April 15, 1986,1
was met with substantial and immediate criticism by the world commu-
nity.2 The positive reaction from the U.S. congress3 and the American
public4 was not shared by much of the world. Arab nations denounced
the American action,5 as did the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries. 6 In meetings of the UN Security Council,7 countries de-
nouncing the raid outnumbered those which supported it.8 Even Ameri-
can allies responded with heated rhetoric.9 However, in the weeks which
followed the bombing, world opinion softened significantly. Cooperation
became evident amongst the Western Allies. 1° While the American
bombing of Libya was fading from the news, a consensus was forming in
the West concerning the extent to which terrorism1 posed a threat to the
* Mr. Intoccia is an Air Force captain assigned to the Area Defense Counsel's Office, USAF
Third Circuit Trial Judiciary, Bergstrom A.F.B. Texas. B.S. 1978, U.S. Air Force Academy; M.A.
1981, Wichita State University; J.D. 1985, University of Denver. He is a member of the bar of the
state of Colorado. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of the United States Air Force, or any other governmental agency.
I See notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 100-107, 115-22 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
5 N.Y. Times, April 16, 1986, at A16, col. 5.
6 See infra note 119.
7 See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
8 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
I1 In this Note, the term "terrorism" is meant to refer to the threat or use of violence with the
intent of causing fear among the public, in order to achieve political objectives. See MALLISON AND
MALLISON, THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC PURPOSE TERROR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 67 (M.C. Bas-
siouni ed. 1975); see also WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 135, 2148-49 (1973). "Terrorism" has been
defined in numerous ways. One author of a research guide to terrorism listed 109 different defini-
tions of terrorism provided between 1936 and 1981. A. Schmid, POLITICAL TERRORISM; A RE-
SEARCH GUIDE (1984). Members of the United Nations have yet to fully agree upon a precise
working definition.
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international community and the manner in which to deal with state-
sponsored terrorism.
To the United States and Libya, the bombing and the circumstances
which led up to the bombing confirmed previously held, albeit very dif-
ferent, views of each state action. To the United States, the bombing of
Libya summed an emergent policy toward terrorism, a policy which had
undergone significant transformation over the past several years;12 repre-
senting a translation of a policy of statements into a policy of action. To
Libya, the American bombing represented something quite different; it
represented the culmination of months of illegal and increasingly bellig-
erent American behavior.
Because the air strike was a short-lived event with limited political
and military objectives, it is possible that the American strike on Libya
will draw little historical attention. However, it is important that the
legal implications of an event of this nature be analyzed in order to assess
the possible long-term impact of such a military strike on the interna-
tional rule of law regarding use of force. Therefore, a preliminary legal
assessment of the action is offered in this note.
12 Since the 1983 bombing of an American Marine barracks in Lebanon, considerable debate
existed over whether American military forces should be used to combat terrorism. Trewhitt, A New
War - And Risks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., April 28, 1986, 20, at 22. By 1984 the position
advocated by some senior policy makers was that the use of military force should be considered a
viable option against terrorist operations. See Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World, 84 DEP'T
STATE BULL., No. 2093, Dec., 1984, at 86. By February 1986, a consenus seemed to have emerged
at the highest levels of Government. Then, the articulated policy was that the United States would:
"act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist
acts"; [it would] take measures to protect its citizens, property and interests" where "there is evi-
dence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against this country..."; it
would "make no concessions to terrorists": and it would "act in a strong manner against terrorists
without surrendering basic. . . principles." PUBLIC REPORT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM, Feb., 1984, at 7. In March 1986, Vice President Bush com-
mented that U.S. policy on combatting terrorism will be one in which there is a willingness to
"retaliate" but not to "wantonly destroy human life." N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986 at A3, col. 1.
Since this article was originally written during October 1986, the author has made every effort
to update the manuscript in view of new developments. It should be noted that one such new devel-
opment is difficult to assess as of February 18, 1987 because the facts are too limited to determine
appropriate policy impact: Allegations have been made that the United States had been secretly
negotiating with Iran and had arranged an exchange of American weapons for money and the prom-
ise that Iran would exert its influence in an attempt to gain the release of hostages held in Lebanon.
Further, allegations have been made that moneys gained from such arms sales may have been
secretly diverted to aid the anti-Communist Nicaraguan Contras in Central America carry out mili-
tary objectives. See What He Needs to Know: With Reagan Unwilling to Force Out the Facts, Oliver
North's Web Spreads Ever Wider, TIME., Dec. 22, 1986, at 14. Investigation into the above situa-
tion is still underway and facts are too sketchy to presently assess the resulting implications.
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II. THE EVENTS
A. The Air Strikes
In the early hours of April 15, 1986, U.S. Air Force and Naval air-
craft simultaneously bombed targets within the borders of the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriyah. 13 The air strikes lasted less than one half hour. The
Air Force element, launched from bases in the United Kingdom, struck
targets at the Tripoli Military Air Field, Tarabulus (Aziziyah) Barracks
and Sidi Balal Training Camp.14 The Navy element, launched from two
aircraft carriers" located in the Southern Mediterranean, struck targets
at the Benina Military Air Field and Benghazi Military Barracks.16
After some delay, Libyan anti-aircraft batteries returned fire.17 Ap-
proximately fourteen hours later, Libyan forces fired two missiles at a
U.S. Coast Guard communications installation on the Italian island of
Lampedusa;' 8 the island, however, escaped unscathed.19
The strike force20 was commended by Pentagon officials as having
carried out its objectives in an "extraordinary" manner.21 According to
Libyan official Abdul Salam Jalloud, thirty-seven people were killed and
another ninety-three were injured.22 While Libyan leader Colonel
Muammar el Qadhafi escaped the bombing unharmed, his stepdaughter
was killed and two of his sons were wounded in the bombing of his mili-
tary headquarters, which also served as his personal residence.2" One
American aircraft and its two-man crew were lost in the raid.24 The
Pentagon confirmed that U.S. planes inadvertently hit civilian areas, in-
13 For a chart listing minute-by-minute actions of United States military aircraft during the air
strike on Libya see N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, at All, col. 3.
14 86 DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 2111, June, 1986, at 8.
15 Id. at 14. The Navy element launched from the carriers "U.S.S. Coral Sea" and "U.S.S.
America."
16 N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
17 Id. col. 3.
18 N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
19 Id.
20 The American strike force included the following aircraft: eighteen General Dynamix F-
11 Fs, fourteen Grumman A-6E's, six McDonnell Douglas F/A-18's, and six LTV Aerospace A-
7E's. AVIATION WEEK, Apr. 21, 1986, at 18. After permission was directly denied by France and
tacitly denied by Spain to overfly the airspace of their respective lands, striking aircraft which had
launched the United Kingdom were forced to fly a circuitous route to their targets in order to avoid
violating the airspace of those countries. The Response to Terror, THE NEw REPUBLiC, May 5,
1986, at 7; N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, Al, col. 2., The path thus taken added 1,200 nautical miles
each way to an otherwise direct flight from their bases to Libyan targets. Id.
21 Manning, The Raid: Was It Worth It?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 5, 1986, at 18.
22 N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1986, at A5, col. 1.
23 N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at A17, col. 1. Libyan leader Qadhafi said that he was at home
when American planes bombed Tripoli and that he helped rescue his wife and children while the
house was coming down around him. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, at 2, col. 4.
24 N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at A22, col. 1.
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cluding areas in the vicinity of the French Embassy.25 However, the
Pentagon also reported that only one to two percent of all bombs
dropped had made an impact in those areas.26 American spokesman said
that two bombs from planes had missed their mark, landing about 700
yards away from the Benghazi Barracks and damaging two civilian
houses and some nearby buildings. Western diplomats reported that
while planes had hit a naval training center, they had also damaged an
adjacent high school for cadet seamen.27 American officials reported that
several aircraft had not dropped their bombs because of mechanical
problems,28 which might pose a danger to the Libyan civilian
population.29
B. Background on Libyan Policy
In order to better understand the circumstances which ultimately
lead to the American decision to bomb Libya, it is necessary to view
Libyan policy in a historical perspective. Prior to 1969, Libya was an
exceedingly poor country which did not play an active role in foreign
affairs.30 In 1969, the discovery of oil and Colonel Qadhafi's seizure of
power by military coup drastically changed that situation.31 Colonel
Qadhafi, brought with him a socialistic vision of Arab unity,3 2 and used
revenues generated from new oil production to increase Libya's eco-
nomic development, to build an army, and to support political groups
around the world.33
According to numerous accounts before the air strike, Colonel
Qadhafi had provided safehaven, money and arms for Palestinian groups
such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General
25 N.Y. Times, May 9, 1986, at A13, col. 1.
26 Id. at 29, The Pentagon said that bombs which landed in the vicinity of the French Embassy
in Tripoli were probably from the same plane.
27 N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1986, at A6, col. 1.
28 N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1986, at B6, col. 1.
29 N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at A22, col. 1.
30 The Libyan Problem, U.S. DEPT OF STATE BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, Spec. Rep. No. 11,
Oct. 1983, at 1 [hereinafter The Libyan Problem].
31 Libya Under Qadhafi, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. BUREAU OF PUa. AFFAIRS, Spec. Rep. No. 138,
Jan. 1986 at I [hereinafter Libya Under Qadhafi], See N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1970 at 1, col. 5 Qadhafi
led a group of young military officers who siezed power from King Idris of Libya on Sept. 1, 1969.
[There are numerous variations on the spelling of "Qadhafi"].
32 Id. at 22. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at A4, col. 1.
33 Over the years Colonel Qadhafi has given support to varied groups around the world from
the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland to the Moro National Liberation Front in the Phil-
ippines. See generally, Libya Under Qadhafi, supra note 31.
Recently, Libya's fortunes have been changing. With the world price of oil plummeting,
Libya's revenues have been diminished. Libyan oil revenue has dropped from a high of $22 billion a
year in 1980 to an estimated $5 billion in 1986-and oil accounts for more than 99 percent of Libya's
export earnings. Schumacher, The U.S. and Libya, FOR. AFFAIRS 329, 334 (1986).
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Command, the Fatah, and the Abu Nidal organization.34 Some of these
groups share the aim of the destruction of Israel, and all have been
known to utilize terrorist methods.35 American officials indicate that in
the two years prior to the American bombing, the Abu Nidal organiza-
tion moved its headquarters to Libya.36 Prior to the strike, reports
showed that Libya supported over one dozen camps where about 1,000
persons were trained in guerrilla warfare, explosives, and arms for use in
sabotage operations. 37 Libya allocated an estimated equivalent of one
hundred million dollars a year for such operations.38
Libyan foreign policy under Colonel Qadhafi has included an effort
to control through violence, Libyan dissident activity in other coun-
tries.39 For example, in 1984, Egyptian officials led Libya into believing
that its hired agents had assassinated former Libyan Prime Minister
Bakoush. After the Libyan press acknowledged Tripoli's responsibility
for the killing, Egypt revealed that four Libyan agents were in custody
and that pictures of the alleged victim were a fake.' Also in 1984, Lib-
yan exiles were the objects of assassination efforts in England. In one
such event, a British policewoman was caught in cross fire outside the
Libyan Embassy in London and was shot to death by Libyan assailants.4 1
In that same year, Libyans were also arrested in the United States for
attempting to buy silenced handguns. In 1985, a Libyan diplomat at the
United Nations was declared persona non grata in connection with a plot
to kill Libyan dissidents in the United States.42
During the several years prior to the American air strike, Colonel
Qadhafi made frequent public statements about the United States as the
chief obstacle in the way of resolving peace in the Middle East.43 In a
1984 speech he told a Libyan audience "we are capable of exporting ter-
34 Id., supra note 31, at 2. See also Id. for a review of the Abu Nidal organization's activities.
35 Id. at 2.
36 Id.
37 The Libyan Problem, supra note 30, at 2.
38 The Sources of Terror, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 28, 1986, at 28.
39 In 1980 and 1981, 11 Libyan dissidents living abroad were murdered. Libya Under Qadhafi,
supra note 31, at 1. For a chronology of Libyan support for terrorism from 1979 through 1985 as
asserted by the U.S Department of State see Id. 5-8. Also, in 1979, Libya was officially designated by
the United States as a country that has repeatedly supported acts of terrorism. 86 DEP'T STATE
BULL. No. 2111, supra note 14, at 79.
40 Libya Under Qadhafi, supra note 31, at 1.
41 For a detailed accounting of events and a discussion of some of the international legal impli-
cations, see Goldberg, The Shootout at the Libyan Self-Styled People's Bureau: A Case of State-
Supported International Terrorism 30 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1984).
42 Libya Under Qadhafil, supra note 31, at 1.
43 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at A4, col. 1. On February 7, 1980, the U.S. Government
closed its embassy in Tripoli, Libya. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1980 at A2, col. 3. The U.S. effectively
closed its embassy as a security precaution following the mob attacks against two French missions
earlier that week.
1987]
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rorism to the heart of America."'  During another speech, Colonel
Qadhafi remarked in response to an attack by the United States:4 5 "We
have the right to fight America, and we have the right to export terror-
ism to them."46
C. The Critical Events Prior to the Air Strike
The critical events which ultimately led to the American decision to
bomb Libya can be traced back to the simultaneous bombings of airline
offices in Rome and Vienna on December 27, 1985. Those attacks left
twenty47 innocent people dead, including five Americans, and left over
eighty people injured.4" Passports used by Arab attackers could be
traced to Libya.49
After the Rome and Vienna bombings, U.S.-Libyan relations wors-
ened. President Reagan accused Libya of aiding the Abu Nidal organiza-
tion which, he said, carried out the assaults.5 0 Although he denied
Libyan involvement,51 Colonel Qadhafi referred to the attacks as "he-
roic."'5 2 Approximately one week after the bombings, President Reagan
ordered a U.S. carrier group into the Mediterranean Sea. 53 Because of
the alleged connection found between Libya and the Rome and Vienna
bombings, on January 7, 1986 President Reagan ordered that no Ameri-
cans could travel to or conduct transactions in Libya without a license;
effectively ordering Americans to leave Libya 4.5  The President also or-
dered the severing of economic ties between the two nations55 and urged
44 Libya Under Qadhafi, supra note 31, at 2.
45 Department of Defense Security Review.
46 Id.
47 Trewhitt, supra note 12, at 23.
48 N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
49 Libya Under Qadhafi, supra note 31, at 1.
50 N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
51 N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at A5, col. 1.
52 Trewhitt, supra note 12, at 23.
53 N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1986, at A4, col. 4.
54 Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 1354 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R.
§ 50.101-.807 (1986) (U.S. Department of Treasury regulations prohibiting imports, exports, trans-
portation or travel to or from Libya; performance of contracts supporting projects in Libya; and
extension of any credit or loans to the Government of Libya). Also for a text of President Reagan's
executive order prohibiting trade with Libya see N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, at A7, col. 1.
55 Id. The Reagan administration later modified its economic sanctions against Libya to allow
American oil companies to operate until June 30, 1986, thus preventing a financial windfall to the
Libyan government. N.Y. Times, May 6, at A4, col. 3.
The international legal implications of the American imposition of economic sanctions on Libya
is beyond the scope of this note. For an excellent article discussing the international legal implica-
tions of economic sanctions imposed by the United States against Libya see Bialos & Juster, Libyan
Sanctions: A Rational Response to State-Supported Terrorism?, 26 VA. J. INT'L 799 (1986). For
several other useful articles on the international legality of using economic sanctions see generally,
Dempsey, Economic Aggression and Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and
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other nations of the world to join the U.S. in imposing economic sanc-
tions. 6 President Reagan indicated that if Colonel Qadhafi did not end
Libyan support to terrorist groups and their training camps, the U.S.
would not lift the economic sanctions.57
While Canada announced a series of steps in support of the Ameri-
can economic sanctions, 58 Western European countries and Japan re-
jected this approach.59 West Germany's Helmut Kohl invoked national
interest and the safety of German expatriates to explain his Govern-
ment's refusal to impose economic sanctions.6" Italian leaders rejected
the use of economic sanctions because, it would harm chances for a Mid-
dle East peace settlement.61 Great Britain's Margaret Thatcher categori-
cally ruled out the use of economic sanctions because it was not an
effective way of countering terrorism.62 The Swiss government said that
it would not join the sanctions but reiterated its readiness to participate
in general measures against terrorism.63 Norway announced support for
economic sanctions, but stopped short of agreeing to apply them."
The imposition of economic sanctions by the United States, further
aggravated relations between Libya and the United States. Colonel
Qadhafi responded to the American sanctions by urging Libyans to
"wage economic warfare" against the United States.65 On January 13,
1986, two Libyan fighter planes reportedly flew within 200 feet of a U.S.
Navy surveillance plane over the Mediterranean Sea.66 Two weeks later,
the U.S. Navy began a week long exercise in the Gulf of Sidra, which is
commonly regarded as international waters, but an area which Libya re-
gards as its own territorial waters.6 7 American officials stated intent was
Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 253 (1977); Bowett, Interna-
tional Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245 (1976); and Joyner, The Transnational
Boycott as Economic Coercion in International Law: Policy, Place and Practice, 17 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 205 (1984).
56 N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
57 N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1986, at A12, col. 3.
58 N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at A5, col. 1.
59 N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1986, at A4, col. 1. The U.S. was unable to obtain multilateral sanc-
tions. It should be noted that Western European economic ties are far greater than U.S. economic
ties with Libya. In 1984, Libyan trade with the U.S. amounted to less than $230 million, while trade
between Libya and the EEC amounted to more than $10 billion. Direction of Trade Statistics, 1985
I.M.F.Y.B. 258-59.
60 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1986, at A6, col. 1.
61 Id. at col. 3.
62 N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
63 N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1986, at AI, col. 2.
64 N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, at A4, col. 3.
65 N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1986, at A4, col. 2.
66 N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1986, at A4, col. 1.
67 The Gulf of Sidra is that portion of the Southern Mediterranean Sea which has the Libyan
coast as its southern boundary has an imaginary line between the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi as its
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to demonstrate "U.S. resolve to continue to operate in international wa-
ters and airspaces."6 In response to the American naval operations,
Libya placed its armed forces on "full alert."6 9 Despite an extremely
tense atmosphere, the American exercise ended with no hostile action
reported between the two nations.70
In March 1986, U.S. Department of Defense officials announced
that a naval exercise was planned in the Gulf of Sidra during the week of
March 23, 1986. The purpose of the exercise was to "gather intelligence,
assert the right of innocent passage, and the right to sail in international
waters. '71 On March 24, 1986, with American operations underway,
Libyan forces fired six missiles at U.S. planes operating more than twelve
miles away from the Libyan coastline but within waters which Libya
considered its own.72 The U.S. Navy responded by attacking two Libyan
patrol boats and one missile site.73  Hours later, U.S. naval forces
northern boundary. The United States and Libya have been at odds over Libyan claims to the Gulf
since 1973, when Libya announced it considered all of the Gulf to be of its territorial waters. The
United States has maintained that Libya cannot claim 150,000 square miles of the Gulf under inter-
national law. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at All, col. 1. While the United States and most nations
of the world regard a 12-mile wide coastal strip as generally the limits of a nation's territorial waters,
Libya rejects this view. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1986, at A3, col. 2. Libya claims as the beginning of its
territorial waters (the 32 degrees 30 minutes line of latitude-demarcating the area where the Gulf
meets the Mediterranean-plus a twelve-mile band of territorial sea. Ratner, The Gulf of Sidra
Incident of 1981: A Study of the Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial Engagements 10 YALE J. INT'L L.
59, 62 (1984). The international community generally does not support the Libyan position. See
World Peace Council Denounces U.S. Aggression, FBIS (No. Africa), Aug. 21, 1981, at Al.
For a discussion of the impact of the Law of the Sea on the peacetime use of force and military
activities, see Francioni, Peacetime Use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law of the Sea, 18
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203 (1985).
68 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1986, at Al, col. 3. The policy behind this action was adopted in
the 1970's as the Freedom of Navigation Program. Those Maritime Exercises, Letter to the Editor,
Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1984, at A22, col. 3.
69 Id. at 4, col. 1. Boarding an armed Libyan patrol boat, Colonel Qadhafi sailed into the Gulf
of Sidra to stage what he called a "confrontation" with the United States Navy. Colonel Qadhafi
said he made the trip to stress the Libyan claim to the entire Gulf as Libyan territorial waters. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
70 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1986, at A5, col. 1.
71 N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
72 N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The legal implications of naval exercises and the
ensuing military clash between the United States and Libya in the Gulf of Sidra will not be discussed
in this Note. These facts are provided in order for the reader to better appreciate the months of
growing tension between the two nations before the bombing of Libya by American forces. For a
discussion of some of the international legal questions raised by the incident, see Blum, Current
Developments, The Gulf of Sidra Incident, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 668 (1986).
73 N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at A3, col. 1. This was not the first such engagement between
Libyan and American Aircraft. On March 21, 1973, Libyan interceptors fired three missiles at a C-
130 cargo plane which flew inside a "restricted area" which Libya had created within a one-hundred
mile radius of Tripoli. On August 17, 1981, U.S. F-14 fighter aircraft engaged in combat with two
Libyan Sukhoi-22 fighter aircraft above the Gulf, approximately 60 miles off the Libyan coast.
Ratner, supra note 67, at 59-61.
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launched additional attacks against a Libyan missile site and against two
Libyan patrol boats. U.S. officials reported that the additional attacks
came only after Libyan forces approached with what were apparently
"hostile intentions."'74 When the U.S. military operation ended, Colonel
Qadhafi claimed a "triumph. 75
On April 5, 1986, a new round of tension grew as a result of a bomb
explosion in a West German discotheque frequented by American ser-
vicemen. The explosion immediately killed a Turkish woman and an
American serviceman.76 Another American later died.77 154 persons
were wounded, of which 50 to 60 were Americans.78 Hours later, France
announced the expulsion of two Libyan diplomats and at least two other
Arabs, who were purportedly communicating with people believed to be
planning attacks against American installations and personnel in Eu-
rope. 79 Commenting on the bombing of the discothoque, American offi-
cials said that the bombing appeared to have been part of a "pattern of
indiscriminate violence" against Americans by Libya. U.S. officials
charged that Qadhafi had singled out thirty U.S. installations abroad and
had targeted American diplomats as possible terrorist targets. 80 Almost
a week after the attack, Reagan administration officials said that there
was "incontrovertible evidence" that Libya was linked to the discotheque
bombing."
After the discotheque bombing, renewed efforts were undertaken by
Americans to press for allied sanctions against Libya.82 UN Ambassador
Vernon Walters was dispatched to European capitals to seek support for
possible American action against Libya and to discuss Libyan involve-
ment in terrorism.83 On April 10, 1986, President Reagan, referring to
Colonel Qadhafi as a "mad dog of the Middle East," indicated that the
Unites States was prepared to strike militarily should evidence directly
point to Libyan support of the recent terrorist attacks.84
Responding to this latest round of charges, Qadhafi denied his gov-
ernment was involved in terrorist attacks, and said that should the
United States attack Libya, he would issue orders for attacks against U.S.
targets worldwide.8"
74 N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
75 N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1986, at A3, col. 1.
76 N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
77 One American amongst those injured later died. Department of Defense Security Review.
78 Supra note 76.
79 N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, at A19, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at A18, col. 1.
80 N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
81 N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
82 N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
83 N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
84 Id.
85 N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1986, at A8, col. 5.
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Italy, concerned about the possibility of military action by the
United States against Libya, called an urgent meeting of the European
Community's foreign ministers on April 14, 1986. Shortly before the
American strike, European Community countries publicly placed blame
on Libya for recent terrorist attacks, and stated that measures would be
taken to reduce the size of Libyan embassies in Europe and to restrict the
movement of Libyan diplomats.8 6
III. REACTION TO THE AMERICAN BOMBING
Colonel Qadhafi condemned the attack and Britain's role in its exe-
cution. 7 Libyan officials ordered more than 200 foreign journalists to
leave the country, only to retract the order several hours later.88 Appar-
ently in retaliation for the deportation of Libyans from Britain, Spain
and Italy, Libya also ordered the expulsion of more than 100 people from
those countries.89 Thirty-six staff members of seven Western European
embassies were also expelled by Libya in retaliation for "oppressive"
Western measures. 90
In the two weeks that followed the raid, acts of violence occurred
which were apparently retaliation for the bombing of Libya. At least five
killings were attributed to groups with Libyan sympathies. Several
bombings and attempted bombings were thought to be retaliatory meas-
ures taken in response to the American bombing.91 Explosions ripped
through American business offices in France and British business offices
in Lebanon.92 Throughout the world, threats were made on American
86 N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at A12, col. 1.
87 N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at Al, col. 5. For Great Britain's role in the bombing, see DEPT.
ST. BULL. No. 211, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
88 N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1986, at A8, col. 1.
89 N.Y. Times, May 13, 1986, at A8, col. 4. See also infra notes 109-12 and accompanying
text.
90 N.Y. Times, May 13, 1986, at A12, col. 5.
91 An American communications specialist at the U.S. Embassy in the Sudan was killed by an
unknown assailant. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at Al, col. 4. In Lebanon, the bodies of two Britons
and one American were found near Beirut with a note claiming the three were killed because of the
raid and Britain's role in the raid. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1986, at Al, col. 6. Additionally, a British
freelance journalist who had previously been taken hostage by a pro-Libyan group in Lebanon re-
portedly killed the Briton in retaliation for the raid. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
British officials arrested an Arab who was wanted in questioning about a bomb found in a woman's
luggage at Heathrow Airport; newscasts in London linked the planting of the bomb to the American
raid. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1986, at A1, col. 4. With an anarchist group claiming responsibility, pre-
dawn blasts damaged stores on London's busiest shopping street. The group stated the blast was in
retaliation for Britain's role in the raid. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1986, at A6, col. 1. Four Libyans
were arrested in Turkey in connection with what was apparently a plot to attack a United States
Officer's club in Ankara. N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
92 N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1986, at A14, col. 4.
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installations.93
American public opinion overwhelmingly supported the air strike,
but believed that the strike heightened international tension. A poll
taken by the New York Times and the Columbia Broadcasting System
found that seventy-seven percent of the American public supported the
bombing of Libya, but forty-three percent predicted that the action
would lead to more tension.94 Thousands of American travelers can-
celled their travel plans to Europe and took vacations elsewhere.95
American Congressional reaction overwhelmingly supported the de-
cision to bomb Libya. Even Congressional members who ordinarily are
quite critical of Reagan administration policies supported the strike. 96
New bills were introduced which dealt with terrorism, including one bill
authorizing the President to respond to future acts of terrorism without
consulting Congress in advance. 97 Another bill proposed allowing the
President to order the assassination of a foreign head of state under cer-
tain circumstances. 98 The raid seemed to also give new impetus to Senate
action on a U.S.-Great Britain treaty limiting certain acts of violence
which may be treated as "political offenses" and thus exempt from
extradition.99
Positive American reaction to the raid was not shared by other
Western nations. Most American allies in Western Europe criticized the
attack.1 "0 Greece and Italy denounced the air strike as "set[ting] dyna-
mite to peace"10' and "provoking explosive reactions of fanati-
cism. . .,,,102 respectively. Though French, Belgian and West German
officials expressed more understanding regarding American frustration
over what they perceived as Libyan terrorism,103 France called the
bombing "reprisals that itself revives the chain of violence"," 4 Belgium
"regret[ted] . . American... recourse to a military action", and West
Germany asserted that "a violent solution will not be successful and is
93 N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, at AS, col. 6.
94 N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at A23, col. 1. Many New York area high school students
competing in a Foreign Policy Association contest wrote essays on terrorism; most favored interna-
tional sanctions against nations harboring terrorists. N.Y. Times, June 9, 1986, at D1O, col. 1.
95 N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1986, at A14, col. 1.
96 N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at A10, col. 1. Democrats Thomas O'Neil and Edward Ken-
nedy backed the raid even before President Reagan addressed the nation from the Oval Office. The
Libyan Equation, NATIONAL REVIEW, May 23, 1986, at 13.
97 N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, at A9, col. 5.
98 Id.
99 N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1986, at B6, col. 3.
100 N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at A16, col. 3.
101 See Manning, In Western Europe, Strains among Friends, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr.
28, 1986, at 24.
102 Id. at 25.
103 Id. at 24-25.
104 Id.
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not very promising."' 105 Tens of thousands of demonstrators marched
and burned American flags in West Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Great
Britain.o 6 The British reaction was especially surprising in view of For-
eign Minister Howe's finding that there was "sound, solid evidence" of
previous acts and future plans of terrorism by Libya. 1o7
Despite an initial anti-American reaction to the raid, Western na-
tions began to apply sanctions against Libya in the weeks that followed.
Foreign ministers of the European Economic Community vowed to press
ahead with a new set of anti-terrorist measures aimed at limiting Libya's
ability to sponsor terrorist activities.'0 8 Those measures included an in-
creased exchange of information on terrorism with the United States, and
other nonmember nations. The foreign ministers also agreed to order
reductions in staff of Libyan embassies in their capitals, and to impose
diplomatic sanctions against Libya. 109 In Great Britain, twenty-one Lib-
yan students were expelled for suspected involvement in "student revolu-
tionary activities,""'  and 200 other students who were studying aviation
were ordered to leave the country for security reasons."' Italy's Prime
Minister Craxi stated that Italy would respond with severity to any new
Libyan attacks on Italian territory. 1 2 Japan announced that it would
limit its business ties with Libya." 3
The most cooperative effort against Libya was taken by Western in-
dustrial nations at their annual economic summit, held less than a month
after the raid. At the Summit, a statement issued by Great Britain, Can-
ada, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, and West Germany named
Libya as a sponsor of international terrorism and condemned terrorism
as an international scourge that "must be fought relentlessly and without
105 Id. at 25.
106 See supra note 95. In Great Britain, Opposition members of Parliament assaulted what
they called Margaret Thatcher's "political infatuation" with President Reagan. Three opinion polls
indicated the British public's strong disapproval of their Prime Minister's decision to allow Ameri-
can planes to launch from British bases in the strike operation. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1986, at
D2, col. 1; See also N.Y. Times Apr. 18, at Al, col. 5.
107 N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at All, col. 2.
108 N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, at A8, col. 1. British Secretary Geoffrey Home, speaking at the
United Nations for the EEC, urged the General Assembly to act to combat the "scourge of interna-
tional terrorism." N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
109 N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1986, at A6, col. 1.
110 N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
111 N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
112 N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1986, at Al, col. 5. See also supra notes 18, 19, and accompanying
text.
113 N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1986, at A7, col. 1. After the raid, Spain expelled a high-ranking
Libyan diplomat and arrested a Spanish Army officer for allegedly arranging the Libyan financing of
right-wing activities in Spain. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. After several months of pro-
Libyan statements following the raid, Greece significantly reduced the number of Libyan diplomats
in Athens. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1986, at A2, col. 3.
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compromise.""1 4
The Soviet Union reacted to the bombing by cancelling a May con-
ference previously scheduled between American Secretary of State
George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.115
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev said that arms control talks with
Americans would only be held if the Reagan administration altered its
foreign policy which was "poisoning" the international atmosphere.
116
He also characterized the strike on Libya as part of a "militaristic and
aggressive" policy that he warned would damage relations between the
Soviet Union and the United States.' 1 7
Reaction from the Third World uniformly condemned the bombing
of Libya. Foreign ministers of the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations
condemned the raid at their meeting in New Delhi, India, which was
coincidentally held the same day of the air strike.118 Though the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries rejected a Libyan appeal for an
oil embargo against the United States in the wake of the bombing, eight
of thirteen members voted to strongly condemn the raid.119 Vietnam,
citing the air strike, suspended talks on resolving the question of Ameri-
can MIA's. 120
In the United Nations, reaction to the air strike was decidedly
against the United States. The United States, Great Britain and France
vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have "condemn[ed] the
armed attack by the United States of America in violation of the Charter
of the United Nations." 121 The resolution was sponsored by the Congo,
Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emir-
ates. Also voting in favor of the resolution were Bulgaria, China, the
Soviet Union, and Thailand. In addition to the United States, Great
Britain and France, Australia and Denmark also voted against the reso-
lution. Venezuela abstained.1 22 Reaction in the UN General Assembly
was similar. The Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the Ameri-
can raid by a vote of 79 to 28, with 33 abstentions.
1 23
114 N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
115 N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986 at Al, col. 3.
116 Id. However, talks were ultimately held between President Reagan and Premier
Gorbachev in October, 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland. See Jackson, McGeary, Searman, Sunk by Star
Wars, TIME, Oct. 20, 1986 at 20.
117 N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1986, at A3, col. 3. Also, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman dis-
missed as "cynical lies" American assertions that the Soviet Union could have averted the terrorist
bombing in the West German discoteque. N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, at A9, col. 1.
118 N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at A16, col. 4.
119 Id at A20, col. 1.
120 N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1986, at A4, col. 4.
121 N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
122 Id.
123 N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1986, at A14, col. 4.
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IV. A PRELIMINARY LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. American Justification
Shortly after the strike, President Reagan formally informed the
American public of the military mission. Reagan stated that the United
States had conducted strikes against "terrorist centers" and military ba-
ses in response to actions by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's regime, which
had waged a "reign of terror" against the United States.124 Reagan said
the United States had proof of a "direct" Libyan role in the bombing of
the West German discotheque frequented by American servicemen. Re-
ferring to diplomatic messages between Libya and its East German Em-
bassy,125 President Reagan said:
On March 25, more than a week before the [West German dis-
cotheque] attack, orders were sent from Tripoli to the [Libyan] Peo-
ple's Bureau in East Berlin to conduct a terrorist attack against
Americans, to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties. Libya's
agents then planted the bomb. On April 4, the People's Bureau alerted
Tripoli that the attack would be carried out the following morning.
The next day they reported back to Tripoli on the great success of their
mission. 126
President Reagan also stated that the United States had "solid evidence
about other attacks Qadhafi has planned against the United States' instal-
lations and diplomats and even American tourists." 127
The President squarely justified the attack on grounds of self-de-
fense, and impliedly indicated that the retaliation 12 was another justifi-
cation for the attack. Reagan announced that "this pre-emptive action"
would cause Colonel Qadhafi to "alter his criminal behavior."' 129 Repri-
sal overtones were also evident when the President stated:
[w]hen our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world, on
the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond ... Self-defense is
not only our right, it is our duty. 1
30
124 N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
125 President Reagan's reference was clarified by U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walters to mean
diplomatic cables sent between the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin and Tripoli. 86 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 2111, supra note 14, at 8.
126 Speech by Ronald Reagan, International Terrorism, U.S DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF
PUB. AFFAIRS Spec. Rep. No. 24, 1986, at 1. [Hereinafter International Terrorism.]
127 U.S. officials later said that Libyan agents had planned a daytime grenade and machine-gun
attack on an American visa office in Paris. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, at A17, col.5.
128 Use of the word "retaliation" in this Note is meant to be synonymous with "armed repri-
sal" or "reprisal."
129 International Terrorism, supra note 126, at 1.
130 Id.
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President Reagan came closest to articulating a theory of retaliation as
justification when he said:
I warned that there should be no place on earth where terrorists can
rest and train and practice their skills. I meant it. I said that we
would act with others if possible and alone if necessary to insure that
terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere.1
3 1
Interpreting the strike as a legitimate act of retaliation is further sup-
ported in light of the Vice President George Bush's comments the month
before the raid, that American policy on combatting terrorism would be
one of a willingness to "retaliate."'
1 32
The bombing was reported to the United Nations by U.S. Ambassa-
dor Vernon A. Walters. 133 Ambassador Walters said that U.S. forces
had struck targets which were part of Libya's military infrastructure -
"command and control systems, intelligence, communications, logistics,
and training facilities."' 134 Walters also stated that those sites had been
used to carry out "Libya's harsh policy of terrorism, including ongoing
attacks against U.S. citizens and installations."'1 35 Regarding impending
attacks, The Ambassador said:
[There is]. . . compelling evidence of Libyan involvement in other
planned attacks against the United States in recent weeks, several of
which were designed to cause maximum casualties similar to the Berlin
bombing. 1
36
Ambassador Walters defended the American raid in the UN as be-
ing in accordance with international law. Absent from his statement was
the use of any language which could be construed to justify the raid
under a reprisal theory. Rather, Walters relied solely on the theory of
self-defense. Referring to the bombing of the West German discotheque,
he said:
In light of this reprehensible act of violence - only the latest in an
ongoing pattern of attacks by Libya - and clear evidence that Libya is
planning a multitude of future attacks, the United States was com-
pelled to exercise its rights of self-defense.
137
Thus the legal grounds used to justify the air strike in the various
131 Id.
132 See Trewhitt, supra note 12.




136 Id. The White House later issued new statements saying that its assertions that Qadhafi
was planning new acts of terrorism were based on a realistic assessment by American officials, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 28, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
137 Id.
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statements made by President Reagan, Vice President Bush and Ambas-
sador Walters may be broadly outlined as follows: (1) Libya incurred
liability because of its commission of terrorist acts against Americans.
(2) The American bombing of Libya constitutes legitimately imposed
sanctions or retaliation for Libyan-supported terrorism. Moreover, retal-
iation serves to deter future terrorist acts. (3) Alternatively, an ongoing
threat of Libyan-supported terrorism necessitated self-defensive meas-
ures. The legal issues presented by these positions will be examined here.
B. Libyan Liability and State-Supported Terrorism
It was not until after the establishment of the United Nations that
codified principles concerning terrorism emerged.' 38 Presently, the inter-
national convention is heavily relied upon as a source of international
law' 39 to establish standards concerning terrorism. Conventions have
condemned terrorist attacks on civil aviation, diplomats, and the taking
of hostages.""4 While debate continues as to whether terrorism is pro-
138 (League of Nations) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened
for signature Nov. 16, 1937 (not entered into force), 7 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 862 (M Hud-
son Ed. 1941), 862 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23 (1938), A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL AsY-
LUM 119 (1980).
139 The sources of law are stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice as the following:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted at law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1, reprinted in I. BROWNLIE, BASIc Docu-
MENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 (1983).
14o For instance, several conventions have been adopted regarding aviation hijacking. The
1963 Tokyo Convention requires parties to the convention to return any hijacked plane and passen-
gers. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963
[1969] 10 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219. Also, the 1970 Hague Convention
indicates that states parties must either extradite or prosecute hijackers. Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105. The 1971 Montreal Convention contains the same provisions
with respect to individuals who engage in any kind of sabotage of aviation. Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature Sept. 23,
1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
The General Assembly has addressed the problem of terrorism directed against diplomats. In
1974, it adopted, by consensus, The Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents. This Convention provides for inter-
national co-operation in preventing and punishing attacks against diplomats and other persons en-
joying status under international law. G.A. RES. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973).
The General Assembly has also condemned hostage-taking. In 1979, it adopted, without objec-
tion, the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.S.
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scribed byjus cogens, 4  increasingly more evidence exists suggesting a
widening of the principles that the world community seeks to protect:
human life, liberty and property. 42 Recently, the United Nations dealt
with the general subject of terrorism. In December, 1985, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly unanimously passed a resolution condemning as criminal
all practices of terrorism. 43 At the same time a UN Security Council
resolution was passed, which condemned all acts of hostage-taking and
urged members to cooperate with one another against acts of
terrorism. 144
There is little doubt that the bombing of a West German dis-
cotheque was a terrorist act. The bombing of a crowded nightclub is a
type of violence that "speaks for itself."14 5 The three persons killed and
the large number of persons injured, were indiscriminately chosen. Vic-
tims included many civilian members of the local community, indicating
an intention to cause terror in the mind of the public. The fact that the
nightclub was frequented by American servicemen and the intercepted
diplomatic cables, indicates a political purpose by the perpetrators.
1 46
Similarly, the Rome and Vienna147 bombings were terrorist acts. If, as
President Reagan indicated, other impending attacks were planned
GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (1979). The object of the convention is to ensure
that those who take hostages will be subject to punishment if they are apprehended within any state's
jurisdiction that is a party to the Convention. States that are parties to the Convention must cooper-
ate in the prevention of acts of terrorism. The Convention rejects the concept that pursuit of equal
rights and self-determination can justify terrorist acts. Parties must prosecute or extradite hostage-
takers under the Convention, unless bound to do so under the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Law
of Armed Conflict and the 1977 Additional Protocols.
141 Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, With a Project List 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
609, 625 (1977).
142 MeCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against Terrorism: The United States Response to
Achille Lauro--Questions of Jurisdiction and Its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 435, 451
(1986).
143 On December 9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly resolution passed a resolution on Meas-
ures to Prevent International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 40/61, 40 U.S. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 301,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986), U.N. Press Rel. GA/7272, at 607 (Jan. 13, 1986).
144 S.C. REs. 579 U.N. Doc. S/INF/41 (1985).
145 Not meant in the legal sense of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which does not apply here.
146 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. At this point it is appropriate to note the
difficulty in ascertaining the factual circumstances in an international dispute of this nature. Besides
governments, few sources exist with broad fact-gathering capabilities of relevant material. There-
fore, information often relied upon must be gathered from interested parties - governments which
have a stake in presenting their position in the most favorable light and which must guard against
intelligence leaks. This difficulty should not prevent an effort toward a thorough analysis. An exam-
ple of this phenomenon exists amidst charges that the Reagan administration engaged in a "dis-
information" campaign against the Libyan government by leaking false information to Qadhafi in
the hopes he would believe he was about to be attacked by the United States or be overthrown. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1986, at Al. col. 1. Verification of these charges is virtually impossible without
information released from an interested party - the American government.
147 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text
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against American installations, diplomats, and tourists, 48 or, as Ambas-
sador Walters indicated, other impending attacks were planned to cause
casualties similar to the German bombing, such plans would constitute
more than a substantial beginning of the commission of a terrorist act.
Consequently, aside from the question of state responsibility, the acts
Libya is accused of constitute various forms of terrorism and the individ-
uals who carried out those acts violated international law. 149
To determine whether Libya is liable for these acts of terrorism per-
petuated by individuals, the principle of external responsibility must be
examined. According to that principle, a state's violation of another
state's external political or territorial sovereignty, is a delinquency which
imposes liability on the offending state.150 All states have an obligation
to refrain from making threats or perpetrating acts of aggression against
another state. 15t This obligation extends to all private individuals who
act on behalf of a state in which they are located. Several theories exist
which impute responsibility to a state for a violation of an internationally
imposed duty: direct liability, accomplice liability, vicarious liability, and
agency liability.
Direct liability, implicitly recognized in the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, holds a nation liable for acts of organs of its own govern-
ment.'52 Under this theory, officials of a state who, while acting in their
official capacity, engage in acts of terrorism, act with the authority of the
state; therefore, the same state is liable.
Under the theory of accomplice liability, 53 a state is held liable
when it tolerates any person within its borders who calculates criminal
activity in another state. When a person engages in such a criminality, a
state has the responsibility to either punish the wrongdoer or to compel
him to make retribution.1 54
148 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
149 The question of whether those acts violated municipal law will not be addressed as this
Note addresses only international legal implications. However, certainly the bombing would be con-
sidered murder by the laws of all civilized nations of the world.
150 The concept of sovereignty encompasses two aspects of independence. First, under the
principle of "internal independence," the manner in which a state uses its territory is generally not
the subject of international law, provided such use does not endanger other states. Second, under the
principle of "external independence," a state may not unilaterally alter that external, or internation-
ally imposed responsibility which each state owes to every other state. I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 254-56 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1948).
151 See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
152 Part I of Draft Articles on State Responsibility [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N art. 5, at 31,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
153 For a discussion of accomplice theory in criminal law see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 495-522 (1972).
154 Gross, The Legal Implications of Israel's 1982 Invasion into Lebanon, 13 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 458, 468-70 (1983).
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On several occasions the United Nations has stated that the act of
organizing or assisting terrorist groups is illegal under its Charter. The
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, 5' and the Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations,1"6 state that it is a violation of the Charter to organize,
assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate terrorist activities as a means to
intervene in the affairs of another state.157
The International Law Commission 158 has also spoken on the mat-
ter of state complicity. The Commission's article 2(6) of the Draft Code
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind prohibits:
[t]he undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a state of
terrorist activities in another state, or the toleration by the authorities
of a state of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in
another state.15 9
The concept of vicarious liability has enjoyed enormous support
over the years under customary principles of international law, and is
implicitly stated in the Corfu Channel case.160 In that case, two British
warships ran afoul of moored mines during passage of the Straits of
Corfu, a channel located in the territorial waters of Albania. The inci-
dent caused severe damage to the vessels and also claimed the lives of
seamen. The United Kingdom contended that its vessels had been exer-
cising the right of innocent passage, and was therefore entitled to com-
pensation for damages sustained. The Court held that a state's mere
control over its territory does not necessarily establish state responsibil-
ity. 16 1 However, the Court underscored the principle that a state is liable
if it knowingly permits its territory "to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other states." '162 Concluding that the laying of the minefield
could not have been accomplished without Albania's knowledge, the
Court held Albania internationally liable.163
Agency theory, implicitly recognized by the Draft Articles on State
155 Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) [hereinafter Declaration on Inadmissibility].
156 Declaration on International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the United Nations Charter, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
28) U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations].
157 Declaration on Inadmissibility, supra note 155, at 11 and Id. at 121.
158 The Commission is a body of legal experts whose purpose is to codify canons of interna-
tional law through the drafting of treaties, and whose drafts are given much probative weight with
regard to the state of the law.
159 45 AM. J. INT'L SUPP. 128 (1951).
160 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
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Responsibility, holds a state liable for offending conduct of persons act-
ing on behalf of the state. 64 Rather than focusing upon the stated or
formal relationship between an individual that performs an illegality and
the state, agency theory looks to see if the state somehow consented, even
tacitly, to the offending behavior.165 The implication of adopting this
theory is that if a state accepts the benefits derived from actions of per-
sons it knows have perpetrated a criminal act against another state, even
after the fact, it may ratify the act and be held liable.
Applying these principles to American allegations of Libyan-sup-
ported terrorism, it must be noted that public information on Libyan
involvement with the Rome and Vienna bombings166 is too limited to
engage in a thorough analysis of Libyan liability. Yet if the Abu Nidal
organization carried out these bombings as President Reagan charged, 67
and if the link between Libya and the Abu Nidal organization is conclu-
sively established to have been material in those instances, then it may be
concluded that Libya incurred liability. Given the Abu Nidal organiza-
tion's known involvement in international terrorist activities,1 68 and
given that organization's relocation of its headquarters to Libya prior to
the attacks,16 9 Libya incurred liability by tolerating the presence within
its borders of an organization calculated to engage in criminal acts in
another state. Also, evidence that Libyan passports were used by indi-
viduals in the bombing suggests a possible official Libyan involvement in
the bombing. This evidence taken in conjunction with comments made
after the attack by Colonel Qadhafi that he considered the attacks "he-
roic," arguably makes the Libyan regime liable under an agency theory.
It may be argued that Colonel Qadhafi's comments constitute a ratifica-
tion of the bombings by consenting to the offending behavior. Nonethe-
less, given the limited information available to the public, it remains
difficult to draw more than a tentative conclusion.
Libyan responsibility for the West Berlin nightclub bombing17 ° may
be imputed under the several theories mentioned above. Communica-
tions intercepted between Tripoli and its East German Embassy1 71 indi-
cate that Tripoli issued directions and received reports on the bombing.
164 Draft Articles, supra note 152, art. 8.
165 Id. This approach is reflected in art. 19 of the Draft Articles supra note 152, which divides
international wrongs into "crimes," and the less serious international "delicts." The two concepts
are used to distinguish between different degrees of seriousness in violation of international law by a
state; the most serious violations have been termed - international "crimes," and the less serious
international "delicts."
166 See supra notes 47-49.
167 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 34, 35, and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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Such communications suggest an exercise of significant control by the
Libyan government over the individuals who perpetrated the bombing.
From an objective standpoint, perpetrators of the bombing might very
well be considered Libyan officials acting in their official capacity.
Because Libyan communication channels within Libyan borders
were used to direct the West German nightclub bombing, Libya organ-
ized, assisted, fomented, and incited terrorist activity in violation of the
Declaration of Intervention and the Declaration concerning Friendly Re-
lations. Therefore, Libya incurred liability under an accomplice theory.
Given the Tripoli communication to its East German Embassy,
Libya knowingly used its territory in a manner contrary to the rights of
West Germany and the United States. By ordering the indiscriminate
bombing which caused injury to West German and American nationals,
Libya incurred liability under a vicarious theory.
Finally, liability attaches to Libya under an agency theory since the
communications directing the bombing constitute at least tacit consent
by Libya to the actions by the perpetrators. In short, Libya incurred
international liability for the West German discotheque bombing under
all commonly accepted theories imputing state responsibility.
C Retaliation in Response to Terrorist Acts
While retaliation was not a carefully articulated justification for the
air strike, comments were made by President Reagan concerning the im-
portance of removing sanctuary to terrorists.17 z Also, a short time before
the raid, Vice President Bush made comments advocating the use of re-
taliation as part of a counter-terrorism policy.173 Such comments indi-
cate retaliation was one theory, albeit a secondary one, justifying the
bombing of Libya.
Prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, the use of reprisal as a
manner of conducting state affairs was accepted. Those circumstances
which allowed states to use force were construed so broadly that at least
until the early Twentieth Century, a state could wage war for virtually
any reason without violating international law. 7 a Under widely ac-
cepted international principles,1 75 armed reprisal was viewed as a matter
172 See International Terrorism, supra note 126, 131 and accompanying text.
By use of the words "retaliation" or "reprisal" in this Note, this writer refers not to "wartime
reprisal" but to that which much of the literature refers to as "peacetime armed reprisal." The
distinction between the two is that while a belligerent reprisal intends to reaffirm the laws of war,
peacetime reprisal intends to reestablish a broken peace.
173 Trewhitt, supra note 12, at 23.
174 For customary law prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter see I.L. OPPENHEIM, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 34-35 (1906). See also Dempsey, supra note 55, at 310.
175 Sources of customary international law are: (1) [D]iplomatic relations between states;
(2) the practice of international organs; and (3) State laws, decision or State Courts and State mili-
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of permissible self-help' 76 within the guidelines of the Naulilaa case. 17 7
Prior to the UN Charter, the Naulilaa case was generally recognized as
the authoritative standard for legitimate armed reprisal.'78 In setting out
the applicable law, the Naulilaa court enunciated the essential require-
ments for legitimate armed reprisal: first, there must have been a prior
illegal act; second, the injured state must have attempted to obtain re-
dress from the offending state for the alleged violation; and lastly, imple-
mentation of the reprisal must not be patently offensive, that is,
disproportionate to the wrong done.' 7
9
In contrast to the concept of self-defense, the concept of reprisal
does not require an absence of any requirement that a response be limited
to the degree necessary to repulse any immediate threat. 8 ° This differ-
ence may be attributed to the different aims or purposes of each. While
the purpose of self-defense is to protect the security and essential rights
of a state, the purpose of reprisal is to impose punishment.' 8 1 Tradition-
ally, the primary purpose of reprisal has been described as a means to
avenge past wrongs or to vindicate legal rights, rather than one of deter-
rence. Other purposes of reprisal have been described as compelling a
satisfactory settlement of a dispute created by an initial illegal act, and
compelling a delinquent state to abide by the law in the future.' 2
Despite the existence of some persuasive arguments to the con-
trary, 183 the strong prevailing view is that the Naulilaa standard has been
tary or administrative practices. G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (9th ed.
1984).
176 Self-help involves the "unilateral protection and enforcement of rights: by force. Bryde,
Self-Help, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC LAW 215 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1982). Self help tends to be
remedial in character. D. BOWETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1958).
177 2 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1012. In that case, three German soldiers were killed by Por-
tugese soldiers at a Portugese post. The attack was largely the result of misunderstandings between
the same German and Portugese soldiers. In response, German forces attacked Portugese outposts
in Angola, a Portugese colony.
178 See generally M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW & MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER 136-42 (1960).
179 Nautilaa case, supra note 177.
180 See infra notes 203-208 and accompanying text.
181 Salpeter, Armed Reprisal During Intermediacy - A New Framework for Analysis in Inter-
national Law, 17 VILL. L. REv.270, 277-78 (1971).
182 Id.
183 The strongest arguments in favor of once again legitimizing "reasonable" reprisals may be
summarized in the following manner. First, the UN Charter does not rule out armed reprisal as a
measure of self-help. The Charter makes no mention of the word "reprisal"' or "retaliation." See-
ond, later authorative interpretation does not rule out armed reprisal as a measure of self-help. The
Corfu Channel case, supra note 160 indicates that a residual right of reprisal remains in modern
international law since that case apparently ratified a resort to forceful self-help by allowing a battle-
ship to traverse legally disputed waters. Third, while the UN Charter is essential to the understand-
ing of the right to implement forceful actions, the Charter should not function as a straight-jacket to
analysis. Salpeter, supra note 181, at 288. Interpreting the UN Charter as outlawing all forms of
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rejected by the UN Charter, and that armed reprisal is no longer permis-
sible. 84 Though the words "reprisal" and "retaliation" are not found in
the Charter, great reliance has been placed on Article 2, which states in
pertinent part:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes Stated
in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles...
3. All Members shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purpose
of the United Nations.185
In 1970, this same view was reaffirmed in the UN Declaration concern-
ing Friendly Relations. That Declaration maintains that "[s]tates have a
duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." '186 This
strong language exemplifies the intensity with which retaliation has been
rejected as a principle of international law. The Chairman of the U.S.
Delegation to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977 observed,
"reprisal" is considered a dirty word throughout most of the world.18 7
So widely accepted is the belief that reprisal is rejected, that few proposi-
tions in international law have enjoyed more support. 88
In recent practice, the justification for reprisal seems to have
changed from that of punishment for past harm done to deterrence of
future acts of aggression.1 89 While this represents a narrowing between
reprisals ignores the realities of a vast array of conduct short of war. For instance, a state facing
incessant threat of terrorist attack has no alternative but to use force to protect its territorial integ-
rity and its nationals. It is preferable to maintain legal standards to govern the use of all armed
coercion short of war, than to condemn the use of all kinds of force. Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-
Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal under Modern International Law, 21
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 35 (1982). Fourth, forbidding all types of reprisal creates a split
between the norm of international law and the actual practice of states. In the long-run, by creating
this divergence, civilized society runs the risk that the substance of international law will become
little more than aspirational slogans. In the short-run, subscribing to a view of international law
which does not conform to the reality of the practice of states places international law in the position
of acquiring its own "credibility gap." Id.
184 1. OPPENHEIM, supra note 174, at 156.
185 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, 3, 4.
186 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-74 (1971).
187 G. ALDRICH, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE DIPLOMATIC CON-
FERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS. FOURTH SESSION 32 (Mar. 7-June 10, 1977).
188 See Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 332-33 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971).
189 This practice has further blurred the distinction between the concepts of reprisal and self-
defense.
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the concepts of reprisal and self-defense by bringing reprisal more closely
into line with the future and threat-oriented aim of self-defense, it should
not be expected that the Security Council will ever accept this justifica-
tion. 190 Although the Security Council's failure to condemn as illegal
that which under customary international principles would have been
considered "reasonable" reprisals constitutes at least a de facto recogni-
tion of the continued vitality of the reprisal doctrine,19 the chief argu-
ment against reading any legal significance into such action lies in the
well-settled, unambiguous de jure rejection of the reprisal doctrine.
To conclude, contemporary international standards regarding use of
force no longer allow states to resort to armed retaliation.' 92 This ap-
pears to be a settled doctrine although some evidence exists that the in-
ternational community is increasingly tolerant of some types of
reprisals. 193
The rejection of reprisal as a recognized principle of international
law requires that any attempt to justify the American air strike under
that same theory must be rejected as "a matter of law." Perhaps the
world community's rejection of the doctrine of reprisal, is one explana-
tion for the ambiguous manner in which the United States has used the
reprisal concept in its counter-terrorism policy.' 94 In view of the rejec-
tion of the concept, President Reagan's desire "to insure that terrorists
have no sanctuary, "95 and his desire to deter or "alter [Colonel
Qadhafi's] ... criminal behavior, '"196 are not sufficient reasons, by them-
selves, to justify the aerial attack.
D. Ongoing Terrorist Threat Necessitated Self-Defensive Measures
Whether the aerial bombing may be justified on the ground of self-
defense must be determined independently of the retaliation question.
The doctrine of self-defense recognizes the right of a state to protect itself
against real and immediate threats. As Bowett noted, the purpose of the
right is to "justify action, otherwise illegal, which is necessary to protect
certain essential rights of the state against violation by other states.' 9 7
The doctrine has ancient roots and has long been of fundamental impor-
190 See Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 21 (1972).
191 Id at 10-11.
192 OPPENHEIM, supra note 174, at 156.
193 Levenfeld, supra note 183.
194 Compare Trewhitt, supra note 12, (accompanying text.) Shortly before the aerial strike,
Vice President Bush articulated a policy of "retaliation," however, shortly after the aerial strike,
Ambassador Walters justified the bombing solely on grounds of self-defense.
195 See International Terrorism, supra note 131 and accompanying text.
196 See International Terrorism, supra note 129 and accompanying text.
197 BowETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1958). See also U.N. CHARTER,
art. 51. For the text of Article 51 see text accompanying infra note 212.
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tance to the preservation of minimum world public order.198 The con-
cept of self-defense contributes to the maintenance of world order on two
different levels. On one level, the concept legitimizes actions to defend
oneself-to respond to a present threat of harm. On a second level, the
concept also contributes to the deterrence of future acts of aggression by
raising the risk attendant to the commission of acts of aggression. 199
Several requirements must be met for a state to properly take ac-
tions in the name of "self-defense." First, all practical peaceful measures
must have been exhausted; second, there must exist a compelling neces-
sity to act in response to an immediate threat; and third, force must be
proportionate to the threat and cannot exceed measures strictly neces-
sary to repel the threat.
The traditional formulation of the doctrine of self-defense, which
incorporated measures taken in anticipation of an attack, may be found
in the often quoted words of American Secretary of State Daniel Webster
in the 1842 Caroline case.' ° The Caroline case is generally recognized
by commentators as authoritative precedent that self-defense is interna-
tional legal doctrine.2"1
In 1842 Americans had been giving military aid to Canadian rebels
across the Niagara River by way of the American steamer named the
"Caroline." The American government was either unwilling or unable
to prevent the flow of such aid to Canadian rebels. When it appeared to
Canadian officials that assistance would continue and that the "Caroline"
posed a threat to Canadian authority, Canadian soldiers crossed to the
American side of the river, destroyed the steamer, and caused casualties
among American citizens defending the vessel.2"2 During the ensuing
diplomatic confrontation between the two nations, Secretary Webster ar-
ticulated specific standards for the use of self-defense. In correspondence
with Lord Ashburton, Webster wrote that in order for an act to qualify
198 PLATO, THE LAW OF PLATO 5 (A. Taylor trans. 1934), Cicero, Gentilli, and Grotius all
recognized the right of self-defense. See Note, National Defense in International Law: An Emerging
Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U.L. REv., 187, 189-90 (1984). For discussion of the right to
use force in self-defense under Greek and Roman law see C. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME, 173-95, 349-66 (1911).
So deeply rooted in customary international law was self-defense that assurance of its continued
vitality as a principle was made a condition precedent to the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
Dempsey, supra note 55, at 310.
The doctrine of self-defense is a fundamental principle in any legal system. For a general dis-
cussion of aggression and self-defense, see M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 964-98 (1981).
199 Maizel, Intervention in Grenada, 35 NAVAL L. REV. 47, 71 (1986).
200 30 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193 (1843), reprinted in Jennings, The Caroline and
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938).
201 Id. at 82.
202 Id.
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as an exercise of self-defense, a state must be able to show a "necessity
of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no moment for
deliberation."2 °3
Traditionally, in order for an action to be deemed "necessity of self-
defense," the use of military coercion as a defensive measure must be in
reaction to the presence of an imminent threat, and must be limited to
circumstances in which no effective peaceful alternative is available given
the time constraints involved.2" It must be questioned whether the
Webster formulation is unduly restrictive from the standpoint of protect-
ing humanitarian and national interests, by requiring that military coer-
cion may be used only in cases in which there is "no moment for
deliberation."2 Present day weapons of mass destruction, such as nu-
clear weapons and powerful delivery systems limiting warning time, may
not give a target state time to determine whether there is "no moment for
deliberation." Such weapons have made opposite sides of the world
closer in time than neighboring states would have been in Secretary Web-
ster's era.206 Too narrow of an interpretation of the Webster formulation
without looking at its underlying rationale is self-defeating. To require
"no moment of deliberation" may in certain situations eliminate any
chance for justifiable self-defensive measures.
The temporal nature underlying the Webster formulation, is an ele-
ment which requires a response to be made close in time to an attack or
imminent threat. 207 Without such an element, self-defense would sanc-
tion armed attacks for countless prior acts of aggression and conquest.
The difficulty in defining a precise time limit--either before or after the
execution of an aggressive act-does not impugn the fundamental princi-
ple. 208 What emerges from the temporal aspect of the traditional formu-
lation is the requirement that a forceful response be made in reaction to
an immediate threat, after practical peaceful options have been expended.
The UN Charter has codified the customary international law of
self-defense. The Charter establishes a minimum world order system by
requiring the use of peaceful means in settling disputes,20 9 condemning
aggression, 210 and authorizing the right to resort to the use of the inher-
ent right of self-defense.211
203 Id. at 89.
204 See Maizel, supra note 199, at 71-72.
205 Id. at 72-73.
206 Id.
207 Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113,
132 (1986).
208 Id.
209 See supra text accompanying note 185.
210 Id.
211 See infra text accompanying note 212. The General Assembly's 1974 Resolution on the
Definition of Aggression as "the use of armed force by a State against another sovereignty, territorial
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Under the Charter, recourse to the use of force by defensive meas-
ures is directly addressed in Article 51 of the Charter. That article
provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
'212
The phrase "if an armed attack occurs" has led some commentators
to conclude that the drafters of the Charter intended a self-defense for-
mulation that is more restrictive than the full "inherent right" recog-
nized by customary international law. Consequently, the question of
whether the Charter carried forward the established customary principle
of anticipatory self-defense or whether the Charter has restricted applica-
bility of the self-defense principle has been the subject of much debate.213
Some commentators assert that the right of self-defense may be exercised
only while an armed attack is actually taking place, but not before or
after an armed attack.2 t4
Publicists taking the position that self-defense may be exercised only
during an armed attack would be entirely justified in their interpretation
if the UN security organs had either established the collective machinery
to oppose aggression, or could and would respond quickly on an ad hoc
basis.215 However, for the most part, this machinery does not exist. War
between nations did not end with the signing of the UN Charter.216 Fur-
thermore, Article 51 envisions self-defense as an interim right, to be exer-
cised only until the Security Council assumes responsibility for resolving
the dispute and restoring peace. Experience has shown the Security
Council to be incapable of maintaining peace and security due to political
pressures.217 Scholars who believe that a response is limited only to "ac-
tual attack," seriously underestimate the potential of technically sophisti-
integrity or political independence or another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter
of the United Nations." G.A. REs. 3314,29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
212 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
213 See Pedersen, Controlling International Terrorism: An Analysis of Unilateral Force and
Proposals For Multilateral Cooperation, 8 TOLEDO L. REV. 209 (1976).
214 See Maizel, supra note 199, at 73.
215 Dempsey, supra note 55, at 309.
216 Id.
217 Levenfeld, supra note 183, at 20.
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cated military systems and of the contemporary techniques of
paramilitary operations.2" 8 In short, the fundamental flaw of a "narrow"
view of self-defense is that it allows for and contributes to situations
where justice cannot prevail.2" 9
A sounder interpretation of the UN Charter is that the Charter
merely codifies the right of self-defense as it existed before the Charter.
In response to those who use Article 51 to assert that the right of self-
defense has been restricted since the adoption of the UN Charter, it is
appropriate to point out that Article 51 indicates that the right will re-
main unchanged when it reads "[n]othing in the Charter shall impair the
inherent right of self-defense."22 Also, the Charter neither expressly
prohibits nor allows anticipatory self-defense; therefore, all relevant rules
of treaty construction must be considered in its interpretation. It is axio-
matic that treaties only limit the rights of nations to the extent that those
nations have explicitly agreed to be so limited.22' Since the UN Charter
does not create new rights, a state's right to engage in those acts which
ensures its own survival is preserved.
The UN Charter negotiating history is consistent with this view.
The travaux prepatoires to which one may turn in the case of ambiguity,
suggest only that Article 51 should safeguard the existing right of self-
defense and not restrict it.222 Professor Mallison, in testimony before
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has stated that a
restrictive interpretation of Article 51 is inconsistent with the article's
negotiating history:
The English language text.. .[of Article 5 1] is neither well drafted nor
consistent with the negotiating history of the San Francisco Confer-
ence, which reveals that reasonable and necessary anticipatory self-de-
fense was retained and that self-defense is not limited to an "armed
attack." The more carefully drafted and equally authentic French text
uses the term "aggression armee" [as opposed to "attaque armee"] and
this is completely consistent with the negotiating history. The words
"inherent right" in the English text also include anticipatory self-de-
fense, since the term refers to the pre-existing customary law which is
incorporated by reference. 223
218 Maizel, supra note 199, at 73.
219 Levenfeld, supra note 183, at 20.
220 U.N. CHARTER supra note 212.
221 BowETr, supra note 197, at 184-85, states that "[W]e must presume that rights formerly
belonging to member states continue except in so far as obligations inconsistent with those existing
rights are assumed under the Charter.
222 Gross, supra note 154, at 480.
223 The Israeli Air Strike: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 218, 226 (1981) (testimony of Prof. W.T. Mallison) reprinted in Maizel, supra note 199, at
76.
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Furthermore, a reading of Article 51, when taken in conjunction
with other provisions of the Charter, indicates that the customary princi-
ple of self-defense was meant to remain unchanged. Article 2, paragraph
4, prohibits the use of force, 24 while Article 2, paragraph 3, obligates
states to settle their disputes by peaceful means.225 These principles can-
not be divorced from one another. A state can hardly be entitled to the
protection of the general principles of nonuse of force in international
relations, when it prefers to use harassing methods of force rather than
peacefully settle its disputes. Any approach that undermines the intri-
cate connection between these principles can only encourage violations of
international law.
226
The view that the UN Charter has not altered the customary right
of self-defense is also supported by several post-Charter events. In the
1949 Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice indicated
that it was permissible to use force in the face of a strong probability of
attack.227 Other examples in which preemptive actions were accepted by
the international community as legitimate situations requiring self-de-
fense include the 1962 American naval "quarantine" of Cuba to prevent
the arming of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuban soil, 2 8 and the 1967 Is-
raeli air strike against Egypt when Israeli intelligence gave clear indica-
tion that an Egyptian attack was impending.229
In the final analysis, it may be concluded that the customary right of
self-defense has remained unaltered by the UN Charter. In determining
whether a given response is a justified situation of necessity, Professors
McDougal and Feliciano have suggested that the requirement "can ulti-
mately be subject only to the most comprehensive and fundamental test
of all law, reasonableness in particular context. 2
30
While the self-defense requirement of necessity has been subject to
various interpretations, the requirement of proportionality has never
been the subject of substantial disagreement. As indicated previously,
the right of self-defense is limited by the requirement that the force used
must be proportionate to the threat and cannot exceed measures strictly
necessary to repel a threat.2 31 Even if the requirement of actual necessity
224 See text accompanying U.N. CHARTER supra note 175.
225 Id.
226 B. NETANYAHU, TERRORISM How THE WEST CAN WIN 134 (1986).
227 Corfu Channel Case, supra note 160.
228 Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade of Quarantine Interdiction: National or Collective De-
fense Claims Valid Under International Law, 3 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1962).
229 N. SAFRON, FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB ISRAEL'S CONFRONTATION 1948-1968, 268
(1969).
230 Nydell, Tension Between International Law & Strategic Security: Implications of Israel's
Preemptive Raid on Iraqs Nuclear Reactor 24 VIRG. J. INT'L L.. 459 (1984).
231 Maizel, supra note 199, at 73. The implication is that the threatening source is where a
response should be directed. One UN Resolution expresses this sentiment: "In the conduct of mili-
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is satisfied, a claim of self-defense must be rejected if the nature and
amount of force used is disproportionate to the character of the initiating
coercion.
Although the proportionality requirement appears to be based upon
a quantitative standard,232 the doctrine of self-defense does permit use of
force necessary to remove any danger which initially warrants the self-
defensive action.233 McDougal and Feliciano have suggested that like
the "necessity" standard, the proportionality standard can be subject
only to a reasonableness test.234 Schwartzenberger has said that a rea-
sonableness test is precisely what the International Court of Justice relied
upon in the Corfu Channel case, in determining the legality of British
naval actions against Albania in the Corfu Channel.235 In short, the
principle of proportionality requires only that such a level of force be
exercised, as is necessary to reasonably deter or abate offending aggres-
sive action.236
Debate does exist over whether measurement of the danger is lim-
ited to immediately preceding illegal acts, or whether measurement may
include an "aggregation" of past illegal acts or an "accumulation of
events" reflecting long-term threats.237 Some argue that the legality of a
response should not be judged by reference to action just prior to re-
sponse, but rather should be judged by reference to the whole context of
the relationship between involved parties.238
Notwithstanding contextual arguments, the Security Council's posi-
tion on this matter is clear. The Security Council has formally con-
demned any attempt to justify totality of violence based upon an
"accumulation of events as an illegal reprisal. '' 239 Therefore, at least for
the time being, any response to an act of aggression which employs a
level of violence which is greater than is necessary to counter any contin-
uing immediate threat must be viewed as impermissible.
Turning the discussion to an analysis of the facts under a theory of
self-defense, the question arises whether the United States exercised all
practical peaceful measures in an attempt to resolve the problem of Lib-
tary operations every effort should be made to spare civilian populations from the ravages of war,
and all necessary precautions should be made to avoid injury, loss or damage to civilian popula-
tions." G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), Resolution On Protection of Civilians, reprinted in I THE LAW OF
WAR 755 (Friedman ed. 1972).
232 Id.
233 Gross, supra note 154, at 487.
234 Nydell, supra note 230, at 478.
235 See Schwartenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 Hague Recueil
195, 334 (1955).
236 Maizel, supra note 154, at 73.
237 Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1972).
238 Id. at 4.
239 Id. at 6-7.
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yan-supported terrorism prior to the April 15, 1986 air strike. Of course,
since the United States engaged in armed conflict with Libya before April
15, 1986 when U.S. naval forces clashed on March 24 with Libyan forces
in the Gulf of Sidra,2' ° the issue may be misstated. In January, 1986, the
two nations had also squared off in a military showdown which ended
without violence.241
In order to understand the tenor of relations between the two na-
tions during this time, it is important that events which transpired just
prior to and during the Gulf incidents, be viewed together with events
which transpired just prior to and during the April air strike. However
the "Gulf of Sidra events" should be conceptually separated from the
"April air strike events" for purposes of legal analysis. Before engaging
in naval activity in the Gulf during January and March, the United
States had claimed that by conducting naval operations, it was asserting
its right to operate in international waters. 24 2 Responding to the naval
activity, Libya further framed the issue by reasserting its own territorial
claim to the Gulf.243 Thus the central issue at stake in the Gulf of Sidra
confrontations - where to draw international boundaries-differs from
the issues involved in the April air strike-state responsibility and terror-
ism. Therefore, for purposes of determining whether there was an ex-
haustion of all practical peaceful methods before force was used in April,
the Gulf of Sidra events should not be considered.
Arguably, the United States did not employ all peaceful methods
available to it in resolving the problem of Libyan terrorism. The subject
of the role of Libya in state-supported terrorism was not a matter of sub-
stantial UN debate just prior to the air strike. However, international
law requires only that practical peaceful measures be exhausted before
there is a resort to force. Indecisive UN responses, such as those follow-
ing the hijacking to Entebbe2 " and the militant takeover of the Ameri-
240 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 68, 71 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
244 On June 27, 1976, Four Arab terrorists hijacked an Israeli commercial jet just after take-off
from Athens. The plane was carrying 250 passengers, including 96 Israeli citizens. The hijackers
forced the pilot to fly the airplane to Entebbe, Uganda. There, the passengers were held hostage in
the airport terminal. Non-Israelis were released. After much evidence showed that the President of
Uganda was supporting the hijacking operation, and after hopes to solve the matter appeared futile,
Israeli commandos flew to the airport and rescued the hostages. After the raid, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) submitted a complaint to the UN Security Council. The OAU complaint
condemned the Israeli rescue attempt to save hostages as an "act of aggression." Despite strong
evidence that the Ugandan government assisted in the hostage-taking operation, Uganda escaped
formal action from the Security Council. The Security Council would not support a United
States/United Kingdom resolution which did not condemn Uganda, but only the hijacking itself.
See J. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF VIOLENCE, A LEGAL AND POLIT-
ICAL ANALYSIS 186-87, 190 (1982).
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can embassy of Teheran,245 and UN inaction despite Israeli requests for
Security Council condemnation of terrorist Fedayeen activity246 all indi-
cate an unwillingness or incapability on the part of the United Nations to
apply its general pronouncements and condemnations of terrorism to
specific cases. Given the United Nations' dismal record of applying its
own standards to specific incidents of terrorism, the United States had no
reasonable expectation that the Libyan problem could be adequately re-
solved through the UN apparatus. Thus, the United States had no obliga-
tion to wait for a UN resolution of the issue of Libyan support of
terrorism before it took upon itself measures of self-help. Where the
United States clearly had a clear obligation to formally inform the Secur-
ity Council of its exercise of force in the name of self-defense, that obliga-
tion was met by an American presentation to that body shortly after the
strike.2
4 7
In the four months prior to the attack, the United States initiated a
number of diplomatic and economic measures aimed at addressing the
problem of Libyan-supported terrorism. In response to evidence248 link-
ing Libya to the December 27, 1985 Rome and Vienna bombings,24 9 the
United States severed economic ties with Libya, and conditioned the re-
moval of those sanctions upon Libya's cessation of support for terrorist
activities.25°
Recognizing that effective economic sanctions against Libya could
only take place in a multilateral framework, the United States also en-
gaged in multilateral diplomatic efforts to encourage other nations to join
in severing economic relations with Libya.251 With reluctant and indeci-
sive reaction to the American economic sanctioning,25 2 the American ef-
245 In January, 1979, the Shah of Iran was deposed and left Iran, replaced by the Ayatollah
Khomenini. The United States permitted the Shah entry into the United States for medical treat-
ment. In protest of the entry, Iranian militants, with the tacit approval of the Iranian government,
seized the American embassy in Iran, taking 66 members of the embassy staff hostage, and demand-
ing that the United States return the Shah and his wealth to Iran. The United States brought the
case to the Security Council and before the International Court of Justice. However Iran did not
comply with the Security Council's resolution calling for the release of the hostages nor did it recog-
nize the jurisdiction of the court. After American diplomatic efforts failed to obtain the release of
the hostages, the United States launched a military rescue, which aborted due to helicopter failure.
Though, concededly, United Nations reaction to the incident created an atmosphere which enabled
the adoption of the International Convention Against Hostage-Taking, the United Nations proved
largely irrelevant to the resolution of the crisis. Id. at 191-93.
246 See generally Y. TEKOAH, IN THE FACE OF THE NATIONS: ISRAEL'S STRUGGLE FOR
PEACE (1976).
247 See DEP'T ST. BULL. no. 2111, supra note 133 and accompanying text.
248 See Libya Under Qadhafi, supra, note 49; see Trewhitt supra note 12, at 23.
249 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 58, 59 and accompanying text.
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fort to influence illegal Libyan behavior by peaceful measures was
substantially reduced. Given the strength of economic ties between
Western European nations and Libya,2"3 and given the statements issued
by those nations' leaders such as Thatcher's statement which categori-
cally ruled out economic sanctions as an effective way of countering ter-
rorism,2 54 it was apparent that any change in economic policy by those
nations was unlikely.
American efforts to alter Libyan support of terrorism through diplo-
matic and economic sanctioning efforts apparently failed when on March
25, 1986, Libya directed 25 the bombing of the West German discotheque
which killed three persons and injured another 154 persons.25 6 Nonethe-
less, the United States used further diplomatic efforts through discussions
held by U.S. Ambassador Walters and other Western nations' leaders
257
concerning ways to deal with the Libyan terrorism, before resorting to
armed force the tenth day after the West German bombing.
Perhaps the United States should have waited until the outcome of
the April 14, 1986 meeting by the European Community's foreign minis-
ters258 before resorting to the armed strike. However in view of the Eu-
ropean Community nations' previous disapproval of economic sanctions
and the absence of any intervening event which would indicate a change
in their position, and failure to make promises that definitive measures
would result from the meeting,2 9 it is unreasonable to have expected the
United States to wait for further developments in the remote chance that
the Libyan threat could be quelled in a peaceful manner. The United
States expended all practical peaceful measures to resolve the problem of
Libyan support of terrorism before it resorted to the air strike.
Turning to the question of whether there was a compelling necessity
for the United States to use force in response to an immediate Libyan
threat, it should be noted that Libya had within its borders over twelve
centers for training sabotage operations, 260 to which over one hundred
million dollars a year had been allocated.261 With numerous reliable re-
ports of Libyan terrorism, 262 it is reasonable to conclude that Libya had
253 For example, from 1978 to 1980 the European Community accounted for more than sixty
percent of Libya's total imports. Economic Sanctions to Combat International Terrorism, U.S
DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, spec. rep. no. 149, July 1986, at 2. See also supra note
59.
254 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
255 International Terrorism, supra note 126 and accompanying text.
256 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
258 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
259 Id.
260 The Libyan Problem, supra note 30, at 2.
261 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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adopted terrorism as a modus operandi in its conduct of foreign policy.
Libya had used its sovereign powers to offer safehaven to terrorists whose
operations were made much more powerful because of its help from
those sovereign functions.
Evidence exists indicating that American installations, diplomats,
and tourists were the targets of future Libyan terrorist operations.263
Colonel Qadhafi has publicly stated his belief that Libya had the right to
export terrorism to the United States in response to an attack by the
United States,2" showing the determination of Libya to execute such at-
tacks. That belief was manifested in the considerable number of Ameri-
cans who had been the objects of terrorist attacks in the Rome and
Vienna bombings, 265 and the West Berlin discotheque bombing.266
While the previous Rome and Vienna bombings should not be considered
when determining what is an appropriate level of American response to
the discotheque bombing,267 such evidence is probative and permissible
in an assessment of the future plans of attack. That evidence is particu-
larly probative in light of Libya's adoption of terrorism as a modus oper-
andi in the conduct of its foreign affairs. In sum, by public statements
and by its own specific conduct, Libya made threatening manisfestations
toward the United States just prior to the American bombing of Libya in
April.
France's expulsion of four Libyans who were alleged to have been
communicating with people planning attacks on American installations
and personnel just ten days prior to the American strike,268 supports the
conclusion that at the time of the April 15 air strike, the Libyan threat
directed against the United States was an ongoing one. The French evi-
dence was corroborated by American accounts that at the time of the
American strike on Libya, a "multitude" of future attacks had been
planned269 against American persons and property.27°
At the time of the American attack on Libya, the Libyan threat
posed by terrorist actions was an immediate one which compelled the
United States to resort to the only action that would rectify the situa-
tion-the use of force. The United States was placed in a situation where
there was no moment for deliberation. The U.S. had to act at that partic-
ular time or suffer further terrorist acts, acts which Libya had repeatedly
demonstrated a willingness to use. American action was reasonable in
263 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
264 Department of Defense, supra notes 45, 46.
265 See supra note 48.
266 See supra note 76.
267 See Bowett, supra note 226, at 4.
268 See supra note 79.
269 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
270 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
Vol. 19:177
AMERICAN BOMBING OF LIBYA
the particular context 71 since any future diplomatic or economic actions
could not have prevented expected irreparable harm to American citi-
zens and property.
The last issue which must be addressed is whether the American
attack on Libya was proportionate to the threat imposed by Libya. The
vast majority of areas struck by American bombs in the April strike were
military targets-targets of command and control, intelligence, logistic,
and training centers.272 The four major areas of attack were two airfields
and two military training centers.2 73 American forces used due care to
avoid nonmilitary damage by withholding aircraft bombs which were
found to be experiencing mechanical problems.27 4 Due care was also
shown by the one to two percent of bombs dropped which had made an
impact in civilian areas.27 5 At least some civilian casualties were due to
Libyan military structures placed so close to civilian sites. For example,
while some of Colonel Qadhafi's family members were among the casual-
ties, the family members were struck during the attack against the legiti-
mate target of Colonel Qadhafi's military headquarters, as the
headquarters was also used as the Qadhafi family residence.2 76 While
each nation is under an obligation to conduct military operations in a
manner which minimizes damage to civilians, no international rule exists
which obligates a nation to forgo a legitimate military target simply be-
cause injury to civilian personnel might take place. It appears that
American forces were directed to targets strictly necessary to repel the
terrorist threat.
A quantitative comparison of the relative damage inflicted by the
American force in contrast to damage inflicted and expected to be in-
flicted by Libya, is difficult to make due to a nondetailed description re-
leased to the public concerning the level of threat that Libya posed in
relation to the United States. However, it may be noted that the level of
damage caused by the American striking force, thirty-seven killed and
ninety-three wounded,277 may be measured against the discotheque
bombing just days before the air strike which resulted in 154 wounded
and three killed 278 , the threat of several future attacks similar to the Ber-
271 See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 185.
272 See DEP'T ST. BULL. no. 2111, supra note 14, at 19.
273 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
274 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
275 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
277 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
278 Eventually, a total of three persons, two Americans and one Turk, died as a result of the
discotheque bombing. Department of Defense Security Review. While the first American and the
Turk died immediately after the explosion and therefore before the American bombing of Libya, the
death of the second American did not occur until some time after the American raid on Libya.
Department of Defense Security Review (quoting U.S. Army Casualty Statistics).
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lin bombing which were planned by Libya2 79 and accounts that a "multi-
tude" of future attacks had been planned by Libya.28° In view of the
magnitude of damages sustained on both sides, and in view of American
efforts to limit targets to areas capable of supporting terrorist activity, it
is concluded that the American level of response was proportional and
reasonable. By limiting targets to Libyan military infrastructure capable
of aiding terrorist activity-damage was limited to the removal of the
danger which initially warranted self-defensive action.28'
In sum, the United States legitimately acted in self-defense when it
responded to ongoing Libyan-supported terrorism by striking targets
within Libya, which had some connection to Libya's capabilities to en-
gage in additional terrorist acts. The United States tried unsuccessfully
to resolve the issue of Libyan-supported terrorism by utilizing all practi-
cal diplomatic and economic methods. Only when faced with immediate
ongoing terrorist threats did the United States use force against targets
whose elimination would help in the removal of the terrorist threat.
V. CONCLUSION
Libyan efforts to employ terrorist methods to accomplish its own
national objectives represents a dangerous and new phenomenon-the
willingness of a sovereign state to shape international events by searching
out groups who share common political sympathies, and then empower-
ing those groups to strike violently at indiscriminate targets in order to
further shared political concerns. The consequences of this state-sup-
ported terrorism are that the terrorist is able to take advantage of all of
the rights and privileges of a sovereign. The terrorist is given access to
considerable economic and military resources, and is able to cloak his
activity under the guise of legitimate state security. This new color of
terrorism coupled with increasingly sophisticated weapons and other im-
proved technological capabilities, suggest that "hit-and-run" violence by
groups for which accountability is difficult to establish is a form of vio-
lence which is here to stay.2"2
The challenge to the international community is to effectively re-
spond to such violence while keeping within the boundaries of interna-
tional legal constraints designed to ensure world peace and order.28 3 A
279 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
280 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
281 See Maizel, supra note 232 and accompanying text.
282 One university study reported that even if conflicts in the Middle East should be resolved,
Americans should not expect the incidents of terrorism to decline because it has become too useful a
tool to be discarded easily by groups seeking political leverage. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1986, at A8, col.
1. For an interesting article addressing some policy concerns caused by terrorism, see Laqueur,
Reflections on Terrorism, 786 FOR. AFFAIRS, 85.
283 For an excellent book which overviews a number of the policy issues posed by terrorism,
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state which chooses to substantially involve itself with terrorist activity
must not be allowed to escape accountability. Given the international
community's clear rejection of retaliatory measures, any state which em-
ploys force in response to state-supported terrorism must be prepared to
convincingly justify its actions to the world community utilizing the stan-
dards of self-defense.
In the final analysis, the legality of the American bombing of Libya
will not be judged by short-term political reaction. Rather, it will be
judged by the long-standing principles of the law of nations. Given sub-
stantial Libyan involvement in terrorist bombings, Libya assumed liabil-
ity for those terrorist acts. Given the measured steps that the United
States undertook against Libya before it resorted to force, the American
government's obligation to defend its citizens in light of impending at-
tack, and the deliberate efforts made by the American government to
limit its armed response to those actions which would repel an immediate
threat, the United States abided by international law in using force in
self-defense against Libya.
see generally B. NETANYAHU, TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN WIN (1986). For a more emo-
tional treatment of the same subject, see generally G. RIVERS, THE WAR AGAINST THE TERRORIST:
How TO WIN (1986). Writes the author in one passage from the latter book: "I profoundly believe
that lawyers and courts, by and large, have been a deterrent to winning the war against terrorism
and in some places have made such a mockery of justice as to make my blood boil." Id. 155-56.
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